Can the defence industry be virtuous?

  • Études

By Dr. Ruffo de Calabre (PhD)

It is certainly easy to point out the past and present failings of businesses involved in security and defence: corruption, support for antidemocratic regimes, the creation of weapons of mass destruction, contribution to arms proliferation, and more. In spite of these failings, it can be argued that the need for countries to defend themselves if they are attacked makes the existence of the defence industry a necessary evil.

It is certainly easy to point out the past and present failings of businesses involved in security and defence: corruption, support for antidemocratic regimes, the creation of weapons of mass destruction, contribution to arms proliferation, and more. In spite of these failings, it can be argued that the need for countries to defend themselves if they are attacked makes the existence of the defence industry a necessary evil.

We can start by hoping that the defence industry as a whole will respect the laws governing its activities. This would contribute to a greater respect for ethics, but given that the law and ethics are not the same thing, could we expect more from the defence industry than mere respect for the law, even if this would already signify progress? Can the defence industry be virtuous?

If it is possible for the defence industry to be virtuous, what would this virtue entail? If we take Aristotle’s definition of virtue, according to which virtue lies in between two extremes and consists of excellence in action while working towards an end that can be considered morally good, a good defence company would develop the necessary means for effective defence while respecting the law and striving to ensure the rapid cessation of conflicts and the establishment of lasting peace and stability under a democratic regime which respects human rights. The extremes to avoid in order to find a middle ground would be similar to those cited in the opening paragraph.

The first failure to avoid is illegal procedures which do not respect the obligations of jus in bello [1], namely proportionality and distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Other issues include the excessive pursuit of profit, which could lead companies to stoke conflict in order to increase sales, support for interventions which lack a UN mandate, and the supply of weapons to terrorist or criminal organisations, among others. These excesses lack virtue, as does the other extreme: the development of ineffective, poorly conceived or obsolete solutions, a refusal to support legitimate self-defence, and so on.

What is the point of hoping that businesses in the security and defence sectors not only respect the law, but are also virtuous? Here, the question of intention is of vital importance. Can virtue be feigned? A superficial reading of authors such as Machiavelli, the author of The Prince [2], seems to suggest that it can, and what is more, that it has no role to play in securing lasting peace.

However, there is a direct connection between jus in bello and jus post bellum: if a participant in a conflict has failed to respect the obligations imposed on combatants, for example through displays of cruelty, it will be difficult to conclude a lasting peace agreement or to maintain peace with the support of a democratic government.

This can also be seen in Machiavelli’s writing: he outlines the only situation where cruelty can be directly superseded by peace in Chapter 8 of The Prince, entitled “Of such as have arrived at their Dominion by wicked and unjustifiable means”. His advice in this chapter is applicable to situations “when one is advanced to the sovereignty by any illegal nefarious means”. As such, failure to respect jus in bello and jus post bellum is inadvisable for a prince (in other words, the legitimate authority in a state); rather, it heralds the advent of an illegitimate and tyrannical government.

At first, it may be difficult to see how this is relevant to the defence industry. Indeed, given that jus in bello comprises rules to be respected during war and as such seems only to apply to combatants, how does the defence industry bear any responsibility? The answer is simple: as the industry produces the means of defence, it is essential that these means permit the application of the principles of international humanitarian law, respect for human rights and respect for the just war tradition. If these means are developed in such a way that it is impossible to respect jus in bello – for example, if they do not enable participants to distinguish effectively between combatants and noncombatants – the blame for the ensuing failure to respect jus post bellum also lies partially at the feet of the industry.

Conclusion:

In The Social Contract, Rousseau wrote that “He who wills the end wills the means also”. If the “end” is a lasting end to hostilities – in other words, a jus post bellum – then the means must respect jus in bello. Given that the means with which wars are waged include weapons, the industry which supplies these means must strive for the establishment of lasting peace. We have already stated that this necessitates respect for the principles of the just war tradition. Can we respect these principles without being truly virtuous? The answer is no: behaving “as if” we are virtuous may deceive those around us, but it does not make us virtuous. Pretending to tell the truth is lying; pretending to be loyal is deceit. If respect for virtue is merely feigned, we must conclude that this feigned virtue conceals offences that imperil the possibility of a lasting peace which respects jus post bellum and human rights.

The defence industry can therefore be called virtuous if the means it supplies support the end of peace. This claim may be surprising to some, who have never thought that their work could be considered virtuous. Is the first step towards virtue not the desire to be virtuous? Can we be virtuous without knowing it? We pursue virtue when we employ noble means in pursuit of a noble end; this still hold true even if we are not conscious of it. It is the practice of virtue, or the habitus, that renders us virtuous. The final criterion for the possession of virtue is surely doubt: a person who is unaware of their virtue may doubt it, while a person who is feigning virtue can be certain that they do not possess it.

[1] Part of the doctrine known as “just war”.

[2] Machiavelli, N. (2018) The Prince. Trans. Marriott, W. K. London: William Collins.

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